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Article 3

Milton R. Wessel*

Institutional Responsibility:
Professionalism and Ethics©t
I.

INTRODUCTION

My paternal grandfather emigrated from Bohemia and settled
in Nebraska City just a few miles west of the Missouri River. His
store, "L. Wessel & Son, Men's & Ladies' Ready-to-Wear," was a
prominent feature on the main street until it burned down more
than a century later. The family home still stands, however, as a
designated historical landmark.
My father grew up in Nebraska City but he moved east in 1890
to attend law school and later practiced law in New York City for
fifty-seven years. During his years of preparation and practice
most people, whether in New York City, in Nebraska City, or here
in Lincoln, were primarily concerned with their own local and regional problems. There was little inclination, need or opportunity
to deal with broader national or international issues of social and
economic responsibility.
In the decades following World War II, however, developments
here and elsewhere have been of dramatic, almost order-of-magnitude character. War-stimulated scientific discoveries created important new products, services and capabilities. These led to
greater wealth, better health, longer life and more leisure, which in
turn permitted more and more people everywhere to become actively involved in societal problems. In consequence, we have all
become national, international and multi-national citizens of an intimate world, almost as concerned with the pronouncements coming out of Washington and events in Iran, Afghanistan or Vietnam,
as with what happens in our own local communities. Cline, Wil-
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liams, Wright, Johnson & Oldfather, the law firm which sponsors
this biennial lecture, evidences that commitment to the broader
societal issues. The organized bar's inquiry into how we lawyers
should conduct ourselves in this new era is chaired by the senior
partner of one of our nation's largest and most eminent firms. Its
headquarters may be nearby in Omaha, but its offices are nationwide and its pratice is worldwide.
We lawyers have not yet advanced into the modern world as
quickly or as effectively as many would like. One legal publication,
referring to the forces compelling changes in the practice of law,
concludes, "maybe lawyers, the law and the legal profession will
always be carried by clients and events kicking and fighting into
the future."' But the volume of comment about professionalism,
ethics and practice stimulated by the American Bar Association's
Kutak Commission on Evaluation of Professional Standards, and
developments along related lines elsewhere, suggest that we are
becoming aware of our new responsibilities to society and of many
of our present problems; remedial action may not be far off.
However, in the important area of institutional responsibility,
we really have not begun to recognize the need for change, much
less to attend to it. That need results from the institutional charActer of modern law practice (exemplified by the large law firm and
corporate law department), of modern clients (such as governments, the great corporations and citizen organizations), and of
more of the modern issues, which pose general, public interest,
risk/benefit, "quality of life" societal problems rather than the personal, party versus party concerns which predominated at an earlier time. Insofar as this new practice 2 is concerned, in some ways
we operate in much the same fashion that my father did when he
began his career at the turn of this century.
Problems created by the institutional character of law practice
are all around us, but we rarely see them. Someone once posed
the question, "who discovered water?" to which the quick answer
was "I don't know, but it wasn't a fish!" If we weren't so accustomed to accepting the commonplace, we would be constantly
amazed by events such as those taking place in the government's
litigation against IBM Corporation. That is truly an institutional
case, involving a government, a large law firm, a large corporation,
a large corporate law department, and public interest issues. Two
months ago the case celebrated its twelfth anniversary; in another
two months it will celebrate its sixth year of actual trial before a
1. Nat'l L.J., Feb. 11, 1980, at 6.
2. This "new" practice, much of which centers on the "socioscientific controversy," is treated in depth in M.WESSEL, SCIENCE AND CONSCIENCE (1980).

See generally id at 1-29.
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judge. When and if the case is ever finished, the final judgment
will deal with an industry which is almost totally different from the
one which existed when the complaint was filed in January, 1969.
Although each participant may blame the others, and on occasion
has, I suspect that judge, government and IBM alike would agree
that what has been going on in the case is absurd, ridiculous, and
Kafkaesque. Yet, the case continues with a life all its own.
IBM is an extreme example of the institutional nature of modem law practice, but it is not an unique one. I have been involved
in one nuclear power licensing proceeding for eleven years. It will
be many more years before it is concluded. I was also involved in
the Agent Orange controversies which have continued for a decade; again, there is still no end in sight. Most other lawyers involved in complex, public interest controversies concerning
monopoly charges, nuclear power, or chemical carcinogens undoubtedly could testify to similar experiences.
The beginning of a new period in American dispute resolution
was marked by passage of the National Environmental Policy Act
of 1969 (NEPA),3 which mandated the publication of a risk/benefit
statement in regard to all major federal actions affecting the environment. With greater frequency, courts, administrative tribunals
and other dispute resolution mechanisms are called on to deal
with socio-scientific controversies whose resolutions require the
sensitive balancing of a vast number of positive and negative consequences of a course of action. Almost inevitably, the parties to
these disputes are institutional-governments, big corporations,
and major environmental organizations. Equally inevitably, these
parties are represented by large law firms.
The legal profession has begun to deal with some of the substantive legal problems posed by these essentially legislative controversies. Indeed, our recent national election may have
constituted a referendum regarding many of the issues. But we
have hardly begun to consider the institutional framework within
which we so frequently operate, and its consequences to our
practice.
I.

THE BERKEY CASE

We are still at an early point in the "risk/benefit" period of controversy and dispute resolution. Most of the key problems are being dealt with at the operating levels in corporations, government
agencies, and citizen organizations. There is little empirical evidence to analyze, and few higher court decisions for guidance.
With those caveats, however, reference to the litigation of Berkey
1

3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4361 (1970).
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Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co.4 will be useful as suggesting certain key areas requiring attention.
In late 1978, a special advisory panel of the National Commission for the Review of Antitrust Laws and Procedures
("NCRALP") reported:
The Panel believes that there exists a fairly limited but important category of actions that occur from time to time in antitrust litigation which
are clearly unethical. Deliberate destruction of evidence, deliberate concealment of evidence, and deliberate "tampering" with witnesses in order

to try to prevent their testimony from being truthful, all come within this
category... [A] general problem of attitude exists among most lawyers
engaged in litigation, whereby the emphasis on winning at all costs can
tend to make questions of ethics appear irrelevant in a litigation context
and whereby conduct on behalf of a client can result in serious adverse
of justice and
consequences to the efficient and effective administration
thereby constitute an abuse of the adversary system. 5
Berkey may be one of the few reported decisions confirming
these conclusions, but experienced legal practitioners will quickly
recognize the commonplace character of the conduct it involved.
Indeed, the distinguished attorney representing one of the lawyers
who pleaded guilty to misconduct in the case, without embarrassment sought clemency for his client at sentencing with the statement, "there but for the grace of God go L"6 Most practicing
lawyers would conclude, "Amen." Trial lawyers cannot spend
their lifetimes marching as close as possible to the fine line dividing legality from illegality without every so often stepping across
it.
Berkey involved a federal antitrust litigation. The plaintiff
charged unlawful monopolization; the defendant claimed that its
market position was the result of achievement and excellence
rather than unlawful conduct. Until the standard of conduct for
monopoly cases is defined more precisely, such controversies call
for the same kind of "risk/benefit" balancing of pluses and minuses that is so characteristic of other major complex public interest disputes. Almost anything and everything is relevant; almost
anything and everything goes.
As its key expert witness, Kodak retained a leading economist
who had served as a member of the President's Council of Economic Advisers, and as chairman of the economics department at a
major eastern university. The expert obtained and analyzed a
myriad of the relevant documents. At first he expressed concern
4. 603 F.2d 263 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 1093 (1980). See Kiechel, The
Strange Case of Kodak's Lawyers, FoRTuNE, May 8, 1978, at 188.

5. Report of the Special Advisory Panel on Ethical Issues in Complex Antitrust
Litigation, Dec. 4, 1978, at 16.

6. Wall St. J., Oct. 18, 1978, at 18, col 6.
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and doubt as to the merits of the case, but finally he came to an
opinion in Kodak's favor.
Kodak was represented by one of the major New York law
firms. The senior trial attorney in charge of the litigation was of
Watergate fame and had an outstanding reputation. The other attorneys assigned to the case included a senior partner who had
enjoyed a long and fine career at the bar, and a senior associate
who was also an experienced attorney, knocking at the doors of the
partnership.
Pre-trial discovery was typically elaborate and intense. Although Kodak was directed to produce all interim reports, the expert's initial written communication to counsel expressing doubt
on the merits was not produced on the ground that it was not an
"interim report." At another point, the expert returned to the law
firm the great bulk of the documents he had inspected. When
asked about these documents, the senior partner, who was responsible for handling this part of the case, falsely asserted that the
returned materials had been destroyed. He ignored the whispered
reminder of his senior associate that the documents were in fact
still available. As a consequence, these documents also were not
produced for discovery.
The trial was before a jury, and lasted for six months. Kodak's
final witness was the expert who appeared evasive on cross-examination thereby arousing the suspicions of Berkey counsel. Probing
questions finally caused disclosure of the existence of the interim
report and it was produced at the eleventh hour. At about the
same late stage in the trial, the lie concerning the destruction of
documents was similarly revealed and they also were produced.
The totality of the conduct shocked the trial judge. He said that
the expert's initial communication was an "interim report" if he
had ever seen one and that the credibility of the expert had been
destroyed on the witness stand. He initiated a criminal investigation with regard to the conduct of the senior partner, who was ultimately convicted of contempt and imprisoned. No one can be
certain what led the jury to its decision, but it returned a verdict
against Kodak which, when trebled, came to $113 million. For our
purposes it seems appropriate to accept Kodak's contention that
the jury was vitally influenced by the collateral evidence of obstruction and contempt and that this prejudiced jury consideration
of the evidence on the merits.
Berkey has been much discussed in practice and in professional
and academic circles. Much of that discussion, however, has centered on the lying by the senior partner. Why did he do it? What
should have been his punishment? Another significant area of discussion has been concerned with the responsibility of the senior
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associate. What was his obligation to the partner-in-charge? What
was his obligation to his law firm? What should he have done?
How do other associates view their obligations?
These questions are important. At least in terms of the standards of professional conduct involved, I submit that the answers
are simple. The senior partner clearly had no right to lie. His associate clearly had no right to participate in the lie. The remaining
questions are not so easy to answer because they are dependent
on traditional enforcement considerations.
However, there are a number of other issues posed by Berkey
which have hardly been discussed. Yet in my view they are the
most important of all. What was the responsibility of the law firm
representing Kodak? What was the responsibility of Kodak and its
corporate law department? What kind of responsibility should be
placed on the other institutions on down the line, such as the expert's university and his professional societies? These questions
point to key problems posed by our modern institutional practice.
Before turning to these institutional issues, however, I would
like to discuss the significance of the collateral evidence of attorney tactics in Berkey. It furnishes an important framework for the
treatment of the institutional concerns.
I.

EFFECTS OF COLLATERAL EVIDENCE

Berkey involved some extreme tactics by counsel which were
actually illegal. It also involved the far more common game-playing tactics which are so characteristic of our American adversary
system and its "sporting" approach to dispute resolution. Berkey
demonstrates that collateral evidence of tactical impropriety may
have a tremendous adverse impact on the merits of the case,
whether the impropriety is committed by perjury, calculated obstructiveness and evasiveness, inexcusable ad hominem tactics, or
otherwise.
Modern public interest controversies can be extremely complex
and difficult to understand. The typical nuclear power controversy, for example, will involve a host of scientific disciplines such
as nuclear physics, biochemistry, biology, and even icthyology and
archaeology. Frequently it will also involve charges and countercharges regarding the motivations of huge organizations or of conspiratorial action both of which can demand the analysis and evaluation of millions of documents and statements covering many
years. Similarly, it may involve the computer simulation of events
which should never happen, such as the failure of a nuclear plant's
emergency core cooling system. No one can adequately understand all the merits of such a case-not even the skilled scientist.
How do judges and juries make decisions when they cannot un-
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derstand the merits? The decisions are made in much the same
fashion that lay people generally make decisions about any other
complex issue. For example, a candidate for open-heart surgery
might elicit the advice of an expert and then test his or her credibility by examining reputation, credentials, and past successes and
failures. In addition, he will note whether there are inconsistencies in what is said and done. If the results of this examination
furnish cause for doubt, he would likely reject the advice. In similar fashion, a jury might discredit the testimony of the analytical
chemist who claims to be presenting an impartial scientific evaluation of a compound if he appears evasive about the sources of his
funding, or if he is caught in a lie about the college he attended.
Although there is not a great deal of available evidence, what
little there is suggests that judges, juries, administrative tribunals,
and arbiters of all kinds frequently make important decisions in
complex public interest cases on the basis of this kind of collateral
evidence. Undoubtedly, the best known example is Ralph Nader's
controversy with General Motors in which GM's attempt to uncover evidence personally damaging to Nader backfired. The result was that the Corvair automobile had to be removed from the
market at a time when the statistics showed it to be by far the safest of all the compact cars.7 Other examples of collateral evidence
which apparently had a similar damaging effect include Ford Motor Company's "pattern of delay and nondisclosure ... through all
its fuel tank litigation," which included Ford's citation "in at least
five appellate court decisions for having obstructed discovery by
giving false answers to interrogatories, and by hiding damaging
documents."8 Similarly, Reserve Mining Company's litigation conduct during its bitter and lengthy Lake Superior asbestos-like fibre
pollution case caused The New York Times to comment editorially
about the trial judge's "exasperation at pettifogging and delay and
*. . Reserve's outrageous tactics." 9 Firestone's legal tactics in its
"500" brand tire dispute were described by another publication as
involving "litigation, delay, contentious foot-dragging and appeal,"
and as posing the questions "What was Firestone trying to conceal? Why was [counsel] so concerned?"' 0 Finally, Mutual of
Omaha Insurance Company's conduct led a trial judge to state that
its defense against an insurance claim, "could well have given the
jury the indication of a deliberate cover-up.""
7. AL WESSEL, THE RULE OF REASON: A NEW APPROACH TO CORPORATE LITIGA-

TION 12 (1976); T. WHrrESIDE, THE INVESTIGATION OF RALPH NADER (1972).
8. Am.LAw., June, 1979, at 23.
9. N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1976, at 24, col 1.
10. Legal Times, Oct. 23, 1978, at 32.

11. Wall St. J., Nov. 17, 1976, at 8, col. 2.
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Legal tactics traditionally have been the province of trial counsel, and are rarely discussed with a client. But lawyers are representatives, not principals. Berkey, GM, Ford, Reserve Mining,
Firestone and Mutual of Omaha suggest that juries and courts will
hold the clients responsible for what their lawyers do. At least in
these kinds of institutional cases where there is a great potential
that legal tactics used in the game-playing of our adversary system
will be very damaging, the anticipated use of such tactics should
be communicated to, and cleared with, the client. The individual
attorney should be obligated to obtain the client's specific authorization for the use of legal tactics which are marginal or doubtful,
albeit technically lawful and ethical. If he fails to obtain such approval, he should be held responsible to the client for the consequences of the conduct.
With this ethical principle as the framework, let us consider the
questions of institutional responsibility, professionalism and ethics suggested by the Berkey case.
IV. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE LAW FIRM
The senior partner, the trial partner and the senior associate
representing Kodak in Berkey were all members of a large law
firm. Their individual responsibilities were clear enough. But
what was the responsibility of their law firm as an institution?
My father was a solo practitioner. Twice during his career he
formed partnerships, but they were not satisfying to him. He loved
his individual practice, his "eye-ball" relationships with his clients,
his understanding of their wants and needs, and his personal control over decisions.
The corporate law firm of today is very different. Even the
smaller firms have scores of attorneys, paralegals and other employees. Branch offices are proliferating at an accelerating pace.
The most recent NationalLaw Journal survey indicates that all of
the top 100 firms have more than 100 attorneys. Nineteen firms
have over 200 attorneys. One has 544 attorneys and 25 offices. 12
Many of the senior partners who manage these firms are necessarily more concerned with commercial problems than with
strictly legal issues. Most are licensed to practice law, but many
may not have actually practiced in years. Few are licensed by each
of the jurisdictions in which the firm practices. None of them can
possibly be a specialist in all the areas in which the firm gives advice. Even when dealing with professional issues, they may know
little more than the name of the client involved, and may have no
personal relationship with the individuals working for that client.
12. Natl LJ., Oct. 6, 1980, at 33-37.
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Although the managing partners may understand the legal, ethical,
and professional requirements, their operating responsibilities will
be also to the firm as an institution. They are charged with the
duty of assuring adequate business and income; of fairly dividing
profits; of admitting new partners; of controlling space, rent, light
and heat costs; of managing pension and retirement programs; of
obtaining medical insurance; and on and on. These duties can obscure their other obligations.
Similarly, as with the senior associate in Berkey, the associates
employed by the firm also have a host of concerns which are not
necessarily identical to the interests of the client. Will the memorandum delivered to a partner match his expectations of quality?
Will it have been done quickly enough? Has enough time been devoted to the matter? Will it equal that of another associate also
vying for partnership selection?
I do not intend this discussion to deprecate the large law firm or
corporate law department. Such firms are needed to handle the
complex problems of the day. However, if lawyers are to serve society properly, we must also recognize that within the ranks of
these great firms are attorneys who occasionally may commit a
crime (as did the senior partner in Berkey); or who occasionally
may have divided loyalties and concerns as to how to act (as did
the senior associate in Berkey); or who may stretch the sporting
approach beyond its breaking point with adverse consequences to
the client (as may have done the trial attorney in Berkey).
Douglas Steven Lavine, an attorney and legal journalist now
completing his Master's work at Columbia Law School, has proposed that every law firm ought to be required to have a formal,
structured program which will remind its professionals of their legal and ethical obligations. He calls for the creation of law firm
ethics committees which would have the following assignments:
Educative Function: To heighten awareness of proper ethical standards
within the firm, by sponsoring discussions, lectures and other dissemination of information on important ethics developments.
Advisory Function: To give advice and counsel to lawyers with questions
about the propriety of a particular course of conduct.
Protective Function: To assist attorneys by involving the firm in ethical
decisions.
Boundary-Setting Function: To limit the uncontrolled adversarialness
which leads to excesses, to law-breaking and to personal tragedies.
Supervisory Function: To act as a conduit to the organized Bar's disciplinary enforcement apparatus where necessary.
CredibilityFunction: To give credibility to the Bar's promise to police it3
self, and to 1place
responsibility for ensuring high ethical standards on legal entities.

13. Lavine, Curing the Code Of Professional Responsibility's Blind: A Proposal
for a New Disciplinary Rule Requiring Firms to Establish Internal Ethics
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The available evidence suggests that Lavine is correct, and that
law school training, even if supplemented by continuing education
programs, is insufficient. Law firm participation on a practical,
working, day-to-day level is needed. Such participation should extend beyond continuing education in adherence to law, beyond
ethical and disciplinary rule, and beyond client mandate. The law
firm should have a "whistle blower" mechanism which meets the
needs of persons such as the Berkey senior associate. It must provide protection against recrimination should an associate pose a
complaint. In addition to providing for this "whistle blowing" response, the firm should also have a monitoring and auditing function similar to that maintained by most large organizations to
control financial matters. This would enable it to uncover areas of
possible problems or concerns.
One might debate at length what details should be included in a
law firm's professionalism program. However, such a debate
would be premature. For example, there is little doubt that the
programs should differ for the 50, 100, and 500 person firms, or for
firms with different kinds of practice. What we need at this point is
recognition that the law firm, qua law firm, has an obligation of
ethical conduct to its participants and to society; the precise elaboration of how to implement that obligation should be saved for a
later day.
The proposed new disciplinary rules are still undergoing
change. When finally adopted, they probably will help to resolve
some of the difficult professional problems which face individual
attorneys in the modern institutional practice. But we need more.
We need to recognize that many attorneys today work in large
firms, and that those firms have independent obligations in light of
present practice. They should not be granted exemption from responsibility simply because their members are independent licensed professionals, equally responsible for what they do or fail
to do. We need a law firm mandate of commitment and responsibility, as follows:
A law firm has a responsibility to its clients and to society, to insure that
the actions of its personnel comply with law, with ethics, and with client
mandates and interests. If it fails to take reasonable steps to perform
this
14
responsiblity, it is responsible to the client for the consequences.

Committees (Fall, 1980) (Unpublished paper on file with the Nebraska Law
Review).

14. Section 7.2 of the Kutak proposals may be read as endorsing aspects of this
proposal. See Kutak Commission, Draft of Revised Code of Professional Ethics § 7.2 (1980).
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V. RESPONSIBILITY OF THE CORPORATION
What about Eastman Kodak Co., the corporate defendant in
Berkey which, by adverse jury verdict, may have paid the first penalty for the misconduct of its counsel and its expert? There is no
evidence that anyone at Kodak had any direct knowledge of the
lying or of the obstructionist tactics of its counsel or expert. But
the judge and the jury seemed to have considered this lack of
knowledge to be irrelevant. Similar lack of management knowledge also appears to have been deemed irrelevant by the public in
other corporate cases, such as Allied Chemical's kepone15 misfortune or Hooker Chemical's Love Canal' 6 problems. In another
context, Chief Justice Warren Burger explained that public policy
can negate a "lack of knowledge" defense as follows:
[A corporate manager has] not only a positive duty to seek out and remedy violations when they occur but also, and primarily, a duty to implement measures that will insure that violations will not occur. The
requirements of foresight and vigilance imposed on responsible corporate
agents are beyond question demanding, and perhaps, onerous, but they
are no more stringent than the public has a right to expect of those who
voluntarily assume positions of authority in business enterprises whose
services and products
affect the health and well-being of the public that
17
supports them.

Honesty, proper motives, excellence, and achievement were the
Kodak substantive antitrust defenses; "corporate resonsibility"
was the thrust of its jury presentation. Berkey teaches that in the
American adversarial dispute resolution environment with its
common extremes of tactical conduct, corporate responsibility carries an obligation to see that conduct by legal representatives on
behalf of the corporation conforms to any claimed corporate ethic;
in this context, the representatives' status as qualified independent professionals is irrelevant.
The law departments of our great corporations are growing
even more rapidly than the private law firms. The last National
Law Journalsurvey shows that thirteen corporations have law departments employing 100 or more attorneys; one had 863 attorneys-over half again more than any private law firm.' 8 Such
corporate law departments perform the same functions as private
law firms, and should have concomitant professional responsibli15. Zim, Allied Chemical's $20-Million Ordeal with Kepone, FORTUNE, Sept. 11,
1978, at 82.
16. Hooker Chemical, Fact Line, Number 11, Love Canal: The Facts (1892-1980)
(June, 1980).
17. United States v. Park, 421 U.S. 658, 672 (1975) (emphasis added).
18. Nat'l L.J., Mar. 30, 1981, at 26. The Legal Times lists the largest corporate law
department as having 924 attorneys with 22 departments employing 100 or
more attorneys. Legal Times, Mar. 30, 1981, at 14. See also Wall St. J., Mar. 23,
1981, at 31.
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ties with regard to the outside attorneys they retain as well as their
own staffs. Moreover, corporate management has a duty to assure
that the conduct of corporate legal representatives matches the
corporate commitment. The corporate chief executive who asserts
his company's integrity and innocence, who publicly demands an
immediate hearing, and who expresses assurance of complete vindication, will not long preserve his organization's credibility if he
stands idly by while his corporate counsel (inside or outside) engages in obstructionism.
As in Berkey, an increasing number of modern corporate cases
involve broad issues of corporate morality and ethics--commonly
known as "corporate responsiblity." There are many different
views regarding corporate responsibility, ranging from the traditional at one extreme (responsibility only means making a profit
for stockholders) to the activist at the other extreme (responsibility means broad social commitment), with almost infinite shadings
and gradations in between. But whatever the differences, one
thing seems obvious: It is the duty of senior management to make
corporate responsibility decisions. Such judgments cannot be delegated to the junior executives or to the legal representatives. In
the absence of full and proper instructions by senior management
to attorneys and to others, it may not be assumed that the conduct
of agents and representatives matches the corporate commitment.
Lawyers are professionals with a long history and tradition of
independence. This is especially true for the trial bar. Thus, management of the legal function by a corporate client is not an easy
assignment, but it certainly can be done. The IBM case furnishes
two excellent examples. For years IBM was attacked on all fronts
for its alleged dilatory tactics. However, at one point, the corporation's senior management took control. Chairman Frank T. Cary
announced at the 1978 annual meeting that he had given positive
instructions to counsel to move forward "crisply and expeditiously." Thereafter the change in tactics was apparent, including
the elimination of an anticipated IBM motion to dismiss and the
drastic paring of IBM's witness list. On another occasion, when the
need to remove the trial judge became apparent to IBM, the matter
was assigned to a special committee composed of five outside directors, all of whom were lawyers not then representing IBM. The
committee consisted of two former cabinet members, a former governor, a former ambassador, and the then duPont chairman. Although IBM's application was not substantively successful, the
demonstration of senior management control was impressive to
all observers. More important, it helped avoid repetition of the
damaging charges of obstructionism, impropriety, and social
irresponsibility.
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In the final analysis, what is needed is a corporate mandate of
commitment and responsibility, as follows:
A commercial organization has a responsibility to see that what is done on
its behalf complies with law, with ethics, and with its own instructions. If
it fails to take reasonable steps to carry out this obligation, it is responsible for action taken on its behalf, even if performed by licensed and independent professionals.

VI. OTHER INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSIBILITIES
Private law firms, corporate law departments, and large corporate and other organizational clients are the instututions most directly involved in the new legal problems. But there are many
others also involved, all of which have concomitant societal
responsibilities.
What were the responsibilities of the expert in Berkey? In the
final analysis, it was his personal evasiveness and his participation
in the obstructionist tactics of the Kodak counsel which led the
judge to comment that he had been "destroyed" on the witness
stand. His conduct may have persuaded the jury not only to disbelieve what he said, but to conclude that the exact opposite was
true.
There has been little comment regarding the responsibility of
either the expert in Berkey or the institutions of which he was a
part, such as his university and his professional societies. Yet his
adversarial tactics negated his claim of adherence to the "scientific
method" and his pretense of scientific impartiality. He certainly
discredited his institutions. Why is nothing said or done?
One reason for the lack of comment about the expert's conduct
is that we are all so accustomed to it, just as the fish is to water.
We expect it. Jokes about experts in litigations are commonplace.
"How much did you pay your expert?"
Individual experts, like individual lawyers, should know their
obligations. But experts sometimes violate obligations, just like
lawyers do, and their institutions should have responsibilities parallel to those of law firms. Professional scientific societies should
make clear in codes of ethics and elsewhere, that the role of the
scientist in an adversary proceeding is to present scientific data
and opinion, not to engage in adversarial excesses designed to win.
Scientific societies must respect the independence of their
members, and should not unreasonably fetter professional freedom. But limitations on adversarialism need not limit scientific
freedom. A classic illustration involved a medical specialist who
testified frequently at nuclear power licensing proceedings in most
extravagant adversarial fashion. Finally, his professional society
determined that it had an obligation to prevent miscarriages of jus-

1981]

PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY

tice resulting from his extremes and adopted a resolution expressing its scientific judgment with regard to his views. Thereafter, it
authorized teams of his peers to follow him, voluntarily and without compensation, wherever he testified. As a kind of "truth
squad," each team read a condemnation of his testimony into each
record. When I heard this presentation in one case, it not only
avoided the damage he might have done, but generated enormous
respect for and aided the credibility of science as an institution.
There are many other measures which scientific institutions
might adopt to enhance the role of scientific experts in adversarial
dispute resolution. The public--all of the rest of us-needs standards, benchmarks, risk indices, certifications and other procedures to aid us in evaluating new scientific information and in
measuring developments against known experience. We need the
help of science to separate value and quality-of-life opinion from
scientific data and conclusion. We need aids for communication
and understanding. Most of all, we need assurance that the conduct of scientists will serve, rather than disserve, our society.
Similarly, institutions for judicial and administrative dispute
resolution have responsibilities to improve the manner in which
judgments are reached in the new brand of cases. For example,
one eminent federal trial judge has publicly expressed the opinion
that half the pre-trial depositions in his court are conducted by attorneys to generate legal fees rather than to benefit their clients.19
Where he suspects this is occurring, he should insure that the client is advised of the costs of depositions in tems of legal fees, delay
of trial, and possible adverse effect on the outcome. If a judge suspects that the trial attorney's game playing is not fully authorized
by his client, he should inquire as to whether the client knows
what is happening and has given appropriate authority. Finally,
until the tactics of expert witnesses change radically, judges
should speak with the experts before the hearing and advise them,
clearly and precisely, that they are obligated as witnesses to tell
the truth, and that they are not to act as adversaries or as
advocates.
A large part of our new complex, public interest institutional
practice is interdisciplinary, including many sub-disciplines of law,
science and business. Although interdisciplinary education is
given lip service in this country, unfortunately our educational institutions have not yet fulfilled their responsibilities for providing
adequate education, training, and leadership for dealing with
19. Natl L.J., Jan. 26, 1981, at 1, 29 (reporting the comment of U.S. District Judge

John F. Grady).
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problems such as those posed by the Three-Mile Island nuclear
scare or Love Canal chemical waste episode.
Effective corporate management of the legal function, for example, would help to insure that the conduct of legal representatives
matches corporate responsibility commitment. In preparation for
this lecture, in December, 1980, I conducted a survey of 157 graduate schools of business to test the adequacy of business school education in this regard. One hundred and seven schools responded
and a number of them identified substantive legal training in such
areas as environmental regulation or employee relations. However, not a single response referred to any training in this specific
and critical management area.
Law schools and business schools should offer interdisciplinary
education and leadership with regard to the new institutional practice. We need empirical data and analysis of the socio-scientific
dispute which is so central to that practice. Interdisciplinary academic attention is especially needed with regard to the guidelines
for conduct by lawyers, scientists, business-people and others involved in the new practice. Most of the people concerned with the
issue apparently agree that present methods are inadequate, or
worse. Yet there has been little constructive remedial action.
One set of proposed new guidelines, for example, has been
questioned as unrealistic, impractical, or utopian. That set, termed
the procedural "rule of reason," is as follows:
-Data will not be withheld because "negative" or "unhelpful."
-Concealment will not be practiced for concealment's sake.
-Delay will not be employed as a tactic to avoid an undesired result.
-Unfair "tricks" designed to mislead will not be employed to win a
struggle.

-Borderline ethical disingenuousness will not be practiced.
-Motivation of adversaries will not unnecessarily or lightly be impugned.

-An opponent's personal habits and characteristics will not be ques-

tioned unless relevant.
-Wherever possible, opportunity will be left for an opponent's orderly re-

treat and "exit with honor."
-Extremism may be countered forcefully and with emotionalism where
justified, but will not be fought or matched with extremism.

-Dogmatism will be avoided.
-Complex concepts will be simplified as much as possible so as to
achieve maximum communication and lay understanding.
-Effort will be made to identify and isolate subjective considerations involved in reaching a technical conclusion.
-Relevant data will be disclosed when ready for analysis and peer review-even to an extremist opposition and without legal obligation.
-Socially desirable professional disclosure will not be postponed for tactical advantage.
-Hypothesis, uncertainty, and inadequate knowledge will be stated affirmatively-not conceded only reluctantly or under pressure.
-Unjustified assumption and off-the-cuff comment will be avoided.
-Interest in an outcome, relationship to a proponent, and bias, prejudice,
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and proclivity of any kind will be disclosed voluntarily and as a matter of
course.
-Research and investigation will be conducted appropriate to the problem involved. Although the precise extent of that effort will vary with the
nature of the issues, it will be consistent with stated overall responsibility
to solution of the problem.
20
-Integrity will always be given first priority.

Our law, business and other schools have responsibilities to tell us
whether these are valid criticisms and, if so, whether substitute
procedural guidelines would improve present practice. Surely
they can come up with something better than we have today, if
they will only devote their attention to the problem.
VII. CONCLUSION
Modem law practice increasingly concerns the socio-scientific
dispute-the complex, public interest controversy with institutional parties and counsel. In these matters, legal tactics are of
critical substantive importance. Under these circumstances, the
individual attorney should recognize his obligation to obtain specific authorization from the client before using legal tactics which,
although technically lawful and ethical, are marginal or doubtful.
If he fails to do so, he should be held responsible to the client for
any harm which results.
We also should recognize that the institutions involved have responsibilities to society apart from, and in addition to, the responsibilities of the individuals involved. Those responsibilities, in
final summary, are as follows:
1. A law firm has a responsibility to its clients and to
society, to insure that the actions of its personnel comply
with law, with ethics, and with client mandates and interests. If it fails to take reasonable steps to perform this responsibility, it is responsible to the client for the
consequences.
2. A commercial organization has a responsibility to
see that what is done on its behalf complies with law, with
ethics, and with its own instructions. If it fails to take reasonable steps to carry out this obligation, it is responsible
for action taken on its behalf, even if performed by licensed
and independent professionals.
3. All other institutions involved in the new practice,
indirectly as well as directly, have responsibilities to insure
that what they and their members do, serves rather than
disserves society.
Lincoln, Nebraska
March 5, 1981
20. See M. WESSEL, supra note 7.

